Based on a theoretical model where state limits on local government policy elicit a move from private value (position issue) to common value (valence issue) voting, I exploit exogenous variation in tax limitation rules in over 7,000 Italian municipalities during the 2000s to show that fiscal restraints provoke a fall in voter turnout and number of mayor candidates, and a rise in elected mayors' valence proxy and win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis of hierarchical tax limitations fading the ideological stakes of local elections and favoring valence-based party line crossing, thus questioning the influential accountability postulate of the fiscal decentralization lore. JEL Codes: D72, H77, C23
Introduction
Local elections have conventionally been labeled second-order in academic discourse to denote their generally less salient features and lower stakes relative to parliamentary and presidential elections that are most notable in the eyes of political parties, élites and the citizenry at large (Boyd, 1981; Miller, 1988) . 1 Their second-order nature would be reflected in the influence of national politics, Prime Minister's popularity and overall country performance on local election results, and in the lower turnout in local than in national elections. However, based on the observation of a 'turnout twist' in a number of countries, with local/regional elections exhibiting higher voter participation than state/federal ones, recent research has explicitly acknowledged that the stakes of local elections depend on circumstances, and that those circumstances vary across localities and over time, sort of weakening the alleged universal validity of the second-order election paradigm (Berry, 2009; Nachmias et al., 2012) . Moreover, the hypothesis of irrelevance of local elections seems at odds with a key assumption of mainstream research on voting behavior and fiscal federalism based on Downs (1957) and Oates (1970) respectively, given that local elections take place at the level that is closest to where voters should think their votes can make a difference (Trounstine, 2009; Clark and Krebs, 2012) . 2 In fact, the conventional second-order election wisdom has been challenged in the most recent years by deeper attempts at investigating the determinants of election stakes, focusing on the role of institutions. 3 As far as the US government system is concerned, Tolbert et al. (2001) examine the impact of the explosion of citizen-initiated ballot measures on electoral participation in the US states, finding that states with frequent usage of citizen initiatives have systematically higher voter turnout than non-initiative states. Besley and Case (2003) find too that turnout is higher in states where voter initiatives are allowed by law, but warn that the result might be due to state-specific omitted variables (e.g., political culture) that drive both initiatives and voter turnout. Hajnal and 1 Reif and Schmitt (1980) first coined the term to refer to European Parliament elections. 2 Based on the contrasting contribution of local governments to growth in China and Russia respectively, though, Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argue that the competitive benefits of 'market preserving federalism' (Qian and Weingast, 1997 ) depend on political centralization in terms of the power of central government to appoint or dismiss local governors. Treisman (2007) forcefully questions the conventional theoretical arguments and influential institutional sponsorship of political decentralization. 3 Fumagalli and Narciso (2012) explore the effects of institutions (form of government and electoral system) on voter turnout and policy outcomes on a cross-section of countries. Lewis (2003) discuss the role of a number of local institutions as determinants of turnout in US cities, including the city manager form of government, nonpartisan elections, contracting out and other outsourcing of city services, and Caren (2007) shows that cities having partisan primaries and no city manager display higher turnout.
Similarly, the devolution of power from the center to the periphery and the increasing degree of autonomy of local governments in the organization and financing of public services in crucial policy domains constitute potentially important drivers of turnout in local versus national elections (Blais et al., 2011) . Percival et al. (2007) find that turnout is higher in US states that spend more on valued public programs (education, health) and impose heavier tax burdens. Andersen et al. (2012) study how turnout in Norwegian local elections is influenced by exogenous variation in government financial abundance. They exploit the fact that some local governments in Norway enjoy substantial tax revenues from hydropower generation plants located within their jurisdiction (an exogenous circumstance largely determined by geography), and show that voter turnout is higher in localities where the election stakes (hydropower generation resources) are higher. Michelsen et al. (2013) use the institutional variation in administrative structure across German municipalities to test the hypothesis that centralized municipal decision-making -i.e., absence of community-level self-governing institutions within a municipality -lowers the probability of a voter being pivotal, and find that centralization of local public good provision depresses voter turnout. Finally, noting that virtually all Western countries became less centralized during the 1980s and 1990s, Henderson and McEwen (2010) study voter participation in regional elections across a number of OECD countries, and conclude that regions whose political institutions have gained salience in terms of powers and responsibilities have recorded higher levels of voter turnout.
As far as Europe is concerned, though, the late 2000s saw a sort of restoration of the fiscal ancien régime in terms of a widespread reversion in the fiscal decentralization process. The financial crisis and global recession constituted powerful centripetal forces, both in terms of the weakening of EU member state sovereignty over fiscal matters, and of the dwindling of the fiscal autonomy that regional and local governments had progressively achieved during the 1980s and 1990s (IEB, 2013). Most EU countries severely tightened the tax and spending autonomy of regional and local governments during the domestic fiscal con-solidation process, most often putting in place increasingly strong limitations on regional and local governments' self-financing power. In France, the fiscal counter-reformation of the latest Sarkozy years considerably diluted the fiscal decentralization revolution of the Mitterrand era, while the sharp increase in Spanish regional governments' debts during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 induced central government to impose quarterly budget reporting in 2011, and to assume the right to directly intervene in regional fiscal policies in case of noncompliance with centrally set rules. In Italy, the profound fiscal decentralization reforms of the 1990s were followed by the imposition of strict budgeting limitations on regional and local governments during the subsequent decade (Revelli, 2013) . This paper explores the consequences of the resurgence of central command over peripheral authorities on voter turnout and on the overall functioning of the local democratic process. Intuitively, and in line with the conventional rational voting framework that has long been employed to investigate the determinants of the individual decision to vote (Dhillon and Peralta, 2002; Feddersen, 2004) , fiscal centralization should be expected to weaken individual incentives to cast a vote due to lower election stakes and dwindling party differentials. In addition, the doubtful possibility on the part of candidates to implement their policy platforms once in power might as well lead political parties and interest groups to expend little campaign and mobilization efforts, thus reducing the number of candidates running for office and reinforcing the negative effect of fiscal limitations on turnout in local elections.
In order to make that intuitive argument more precise, I rely on Ghosal and Lockwood (2009) model of voluntary, costly voting, where ideologically biased agents receive informative signals about commonly valued candidate competence, and I adapt it to a decentralized set-up where localities elect one of two candidates to implement a policy that might be subject to state limitations. I show that, by narrowing the position issue gap between candidates, fiscal centralization makes it more likely that local voting occurs according to competence signals than to ideological views, and that such switch lowers turnout due to the operation of two forces. First, as signals are informative and correlated across residents in a locality, there is an incentive to free ride when the others are voting according to signals. Second, the expected benefit from voting according to noisy signals of candidate valence is lower than when voting according to nonstochastic private values on position issues. Finally, and in spite of the fall in turnout, the switch to common value voting improves the selection property of local democratic systems by favoring success of the most valent candidates, and in likely circumstances with a larger margin of votes than when voting occurs according to private values.
In multi-tiered government structures, top-down fiscal restraints on local governments would therefore, on one hand, lower the stakes and exacerbate the parochial, second-order character of local contests, discourage voter participation, and interfere with the voice mechanism on which local democracy is believed to rest. On the other hand, by deemphasizing or altogether removing purely ideological stances from local elections, fiscal restraints would tend to facilitate rational voters' party line crossing and valence-based selection mechanisms, thus questioning one of the fundamental postulates of the fiscal federalism lore, namely the widespread credence that tax decentralization is a key ingredient to foster local government performance and accountability. I next analyze empirically the fiscal hierarchy-local democracy nexus by investigating the impact of the Italian system of top-down tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) on turnout rates and candidate competition in the elections that were held throughout the past decade in over 7,000 Italian municipalities.
Municipal elections take place every five years, with direct election of the mayor in a single or dual ballot depending on resident population size, and display an average turnout rate of almost 80 percent. Importantly, the election schedule across the country is staggered, meaning that several elections occurred in each of the 2001 to 2010 years. By exploiting the unique institutional features of the Italian system of local TELs, particularly their exogenous sources of timeseries and cross-locality variation, and by relying on local turnout in parallel Parliamentary elections as a counterfactual, I employ a difference-in-differences research design to find that tax limits provoke a moderate fall in voter turnout and mayoral candidate competition, some improvement in candidate valence proxies, and a sizeable rise in elected mayors' win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis that, by fading the ideological stakes of local elections, fiscal centralization favors valence-driven vote convergence via party line crossing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 presents the institu- Finally, section 6 concludes.
Local elections in Italy
Elections in Italian municipalities take place every five years, with direct election of the mayor in a single or dual ballot depending on resident population size, with larger localities (>15,000 inhabitants) having a runoff stage among the two most voted candidates if none gets more than 50% of the votes in the first stage.
Voters express a vote for a mayor candidate as well as for a councillor candidate if they wish. 4 Voting is formally mandatory for all aged above 18, though no sanctions exist for abstainers. Importantly for the purposes of our empirical analysis, the election schedule across the country is staggered, meaning that several elections occurred in each of the 2001-2010 years, as shown in table 1.
The municipal level of government is highly fragmented, with average population size of around 7,000 inhabitants. 5 As shown in table 2, the number of cities above 100,000 inhabitants is only around 40, just two of them exceeding one million residents, with more than half localities having less than 3,000 residents. This means that in most municipalities a single vote can make a difference, either for the mayor candidate that is elected, or for the composition of the municipal council. For instance, in the elections held in 2009 in the municipality of Monte San Vito (Marche), 5,374 registered voters, the two most voted candidates each got exactly the same number of votes (1,653), thus requiring an ad hoc second round of elections. More sensationally, the city of Meda (Lombardia), with an electorate of 18,485, had the mayor elected with a single vote difference at the runoff held in May 2012. 6 Of course, such close outcomes are rare, as shown in table 3, as they involve only a few dozen municipalities over thousands of elections. Table 4 shows, though, that relatively narrow vote margins are far from uncommon. Moreover, the likelihood that a vote be decisive for the selection of candidates into the local councils -whose number varies 4 2 3 of the council seats are assigned to the councillor candidates (frequently grouped in one or more parties) supporting the mayor that is elected. 5 Municipal governments are mainly in charge of urban public transport, road maintenance and cleaning, waste collection and management, water and sewer services, environmental monitoring and protection, planning and zoning. 6 Ministero dell'Interno, Municipal election data (http://elezionistorico.interno.it).
depending on population size, from 12 councillors (<3,000 inhabitants) to 60 (>1,000,000 inhabitants) -is much higher. In smaller communities, a handful of votes can frequently be enough to gain a seat in the local council. 7 In fact, the closeness of mayoral races varies considerably across elections.
Let us focus on the vote difference between the two most voted mayor candidates that was registered in the over 14,000 municipal elections that took place across Italy between 2001 and 2010. Figure 1 On the other hand, turnout rates never drop below 60% in larger (population above 20,000) localities. own personal bias and on candidates' competence, the latter being a function of the state of the world that is realized. Voter i's payoff from candidate X is:
where λ m ∈ [0, 1], m = 1, ..., M , captures the weight of ideological bias (the first component in (1)) relative to candidate competence (the second component in (1)) in the payoff function, and is allowed to vary across localities only. Each voter i is ideologically biased towards one of the candidates X ∈ {A, B}, with:
in (1) 
Centralization
Let now local governments be subject to state limitations on their policy instrument of the general form: 0 ≤ π ≤ π X m ≤ π. Voter i's payoff from candidate X in the presence of the above limits can be expressed as:
where e u denotes the private payoff function in the presence of state limitations,
is the extent to which state limits narrow the payoff gap between the two candidates' policies. Indeed, 4 m > 0 requires the limit to be binding on at least one of the candidates, and 4 m = 1 results from complete policy centralization (π = π; π < π X m ; π > π X m ; X = A, B). With voter preferences given by (3) and (4), the critical value of λ m above which all those who vote do so according to private values is: 9 perpetuates low accountability equilibria in which people cast their votes uncritically along ethnic lines. In our context, tighter state limitation of municipal governments discards local party loyalty and favors common value voting.
Turnout and election outcomes
State limitation of local government fiscal autonomy can have important consequences on the functioning of the decentralized democratic process in terms of turnout, political competition, and election outcomes. As far as voter turnout is concerned, the regime switch from voting according to private values to voting according to common values can be expected to lower turnout due to the operation of the following two forces. 10 First, as signals are informative and correlated across residents in a locality, there is an incentive to free ride when the others are voting according to signals: the competent candidate is going to be elected with probability q > 0.5 relative to 0.5 when everyone votes according to private values. Second, the benefit from voting according to the signal is q − 0.5, i.e., the extra content of information on the competent candidate in the signal (q) relative to random selection (0.5). On the other hand, when voting according to private values the benefit is 0.5 > q − 0.5, i.e., the private payoff from the preferred candidate (1) relative to random selection (0.5). As a result, the turnout drop that should be expected to result from policy centralization does not in itself constitute a symptom of a struggling decentralized democracy, but can instead be safely interpreted as a reflection of secularized, pragmatic polities.
In fact, the turnout drop as a result of state limitations can be conjectured to be reinforced when relaxing the hypothesis of a fixed two-candidate race, and allowing for an endogenously determined number of mayor candidates. If, as in citizen-candidate models (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) , the number of candidates who enter a political competition depends negatively on the costs of running for office and positively on the benefits of winning the election (i.e., the chance of implementing their preferred policy), fiscal centralization reduces the latter by narrowing the admissible local policy space. The expected utility loss from ending up in a policy corner solution generated by fiscal limits rather then selecting the utility maximizing alternative can be expected to lower the number of candidates in equilibrium, thus likely magnifying the negative impact of policy centralization on turnout through voter alienation. 11 Finally, the limit-driven switch from ideological to signal voting can be expected to affect the very outcomes of local elections. First, conditional on the set of candidates and given that the competence signal q > 0.5, policy centralization would make election of the competent candidate more likely, and the more so the more accurate is the signal. This is in line with recent research on the effect of political competition on policy performance, in particular with the idea that a fall in voters' ideological attachment and polarization leads to more cost-efficient policies (Svensson, 2005) , lower equilibrium political rents (Aldashev, 2008) , better performance in the provision of local public services (Geys et al., 2010) , and creation of a growth-promoting environment (Besley et al., 2010) . Second, given that c im , τ im , and σ im are mutually independent, and that the signal is informative (q > 0.5), the expected win margin change that is provoked by a centralization-driven switch from private value voting to signal voting in a two-candidate race is positive if:
where γ X m is the share of voters that are ideologically attached to party X in locality m. 12 A switch to competence signal voting will lead to wider win margins the more accurate is the signal and the more evenly spread is party attachment. Indeed, the win margin increases with common value voting in an ideologically split electorate (γ A m = γ B m ). 11 It has been argued, though, that an increase in the number of parties lowers the power and willingness to vote of the electorate by calling for post-election coalition formation (Geys and Heyndels, 2006) . Relatedly, Lizzeri and Persico (2005) show that party proliferation may reduce welfare by channeling resources into targeted transfers at the expense of general interest public goods. Zhuravskaya (2007) finds that party fractionalization worsens government quality and performance in developing countries. 12 The expected win margin in a two-candidate race when voting occurs according to private values is:
When voting is according to signals, and with q > 0.5, the expected win margin is: q − (1 − q) = 2q − 1. Italian municipalities' own revenues are mainly constituted by a local property tax and a surcharge on the national personal income tax. The latter was introduced nationwide in 1999 as part of a wider process of fiscal decentralization that started in 1993. 13 The municipal income surcharge has since represented an important source of revenue for municipal governments, amounting to around and for the three subsequent years, a nationwide rate limit was set at 0.5% of the income tax base, and annual municipal rate increases could not exceed 0.2%. This implies that a municipality consistently setting the maximum allowed rates would hit the limit of 0.5% in 2001, and be at a corner solution there in 2002. The voter turnout rate is defined as the ratio of actual votes cast relative to eligible population. Since it is bound by definition between 0 and 100%, I make a conventional log of the odds transformation of the dependent variable in equation (7): 16 ln
The Italian local tax limitation system
where f m absorbs all time-invariant local traits affecting turnout (e.g., social
and civic capital endowment), y t controls for common influences on all elections taking place in a given year, and ε mt captures unobserved time-varying influences on turnout in locality m. The panel data set is unbalanced, both in the sense that some municipalities record more than two elections during the decade (due, for instance, to mayor resignation during the term of office), and because elections occur at different points in time (table 1 ). The f m terms are treated as fixed, and equation (7) is conventionally estimated by taking deviations from group means.
In addition to the tax freeze dummy T L mt , richer specifications of equation (7) include the size of population among the determinants of turnout, along with an indicator of election closeness given by the vote difference between the two most voted mayor candidates. I have to use an ex post race closeness measure because ex ante information on the closeness of elections is not available for municipal elections. Finally, I include the number of candidates running for mayor position. The latter variable might itself be affected by the stakes of elections, so that the estimated effect of tax limits on turnout after controlling for the number of mayor candidates reveals whether tax limits have a direct effect on voter turnout, or they only have a mediated one via lower political competition.
The estimation results of equation (7) on the 2001-2010 election panel are reported in table 6. Column (6.1) relies on a specification that only has the tax freeze dummy (T L) and municipality and year fixed effects. The subsequent columns of table 6 report the results when allowing for the other determinants of turnout. Expectedly, the number of mayor candidates has a positive and highly significant effect on turnout, while the size of population and the ex post win margin are estimated to have little or no effect on voter participation. As for the key tax freeze dummy, it is estimated to have a significant negative effect on voter turnout. Interestingly, the effect is robust to conditioning on the number of mayor candidates. In terms of magnitude of the impact, the marginal effects of the regressors on turnout vary with the level of the dependent variable in this model. Table 7 reports the estimated effects on the dependent variable at a number of turnout rates for the crucial T L dummy, showing that tax limits have a moderate impact on turnout of around one percentage point.
The 2006 treatment
It might be argued that, due to universal tax freeze in a number of years, the effect of tax limits as defined above would be difficult to separately identify from unobserved statewide influences on voter turnout -due, for instance to concomitant parliamentary, regional or European assembly elections -that have As far as turnout at municipal elections is concerned, the lower panel of 18 Once at the polls, voters could in principle abstain for either if they wished. Table A1 in the Appendix shows that the election closeness proxy has no significant impact on turnout, while population and number of mayor candidates have significant negative and positive effects respectively. dates in the treated relative to the control group). Table A1 in the Appendix shows that the declining degree of competition for office in the tax limited sample relative to the control sample is not driven by changes in population size between the two elections. Table 11 shows that the win margin increases in the treated group and slightly decreases in the control group. Overall, tax limits appear to favor a strikingly large convergence of votes towards one of the candidates: where tax limits bind, the win margin of the mayor is larger by over 5 percentage points relative to the control group. The estimated effect is robust to controlling for the difference in the number of candidates between 2001 and 2006: table A1 in the Appendix expectedly shows that the number of mayor candidates has a negative impact on the win margin. While an additional candidate reduces on average the mayor's win margin by almost 6 percentage points, still the effect of fiscal limitations remains large and significant (over 4 percentage points), thus ruling out the possibility that higher win margins are sort of mechanically determined by the fall in competition for office.
Tax limits and political competition

Tax limits and valence
In fact, the two pieces of direct and indirect empirical evidence discussed above are not reciprocally inconsistent. It turns out that distinguished professional status mayors that are elected in tax limited jurisdictions in 2006 (94 mayors) enjoy an excess win margin improvement of more than ten percentage points (an effect that is significant at the 10% level of confidence) over similarly qualified mayors in the control localities. Taken together, both the direct evidence based on mayors' valence proxy and the indirect evidence based on elected mayors' actual win margins are compatible with the hypothesis of fiscal centralization influencing election outcomes by facilitating common value voting based on candidates' valence signals. Table A4 in the Appendix reports the results of a number of checks of the robustness of the above evidence. I first drop the observations in the top 5% and 21 The first round outcome is considered in case the election has a run-off stage.
Robustness analysis
bottom 5% of the 2006 voter turnout distribution (turnout rate below 57.6% and above 87.4% respectively), and compute the difference-in-differences on the main variables of interest for the remaining 1,020 election pairs 2001-2006. This is meant to allow for the possibility, further discussed below, that the results be driven by unusually large shocks to voting in local elections (e.g., corruption scandals) that could be correlated with local tax setting policy. I also experi- On one hand, the results in this paper pay lip service to the view that hierarchical fiscal limitations exacerbate the parochial, second-order character of municipal contests, discourage voter involvement in local issues, and interfere with the fundamental voice mechanism on which democracy is believed to rest.
On the other hand, the claim of this paper is that, by fading the ideological stakes of local elections and favoring a switch from private value to common value voting, fiscal restraints tend in fact to facilitate rational voters' party line crossing in quest of competence in government, and falling local turnout rates can be interpreted as an innocuous reflection of secularized, pragmatic polities in fiscally centralized government structures. More generally, explicit consider-ation of the position-valence dilemma in voting over hierarchically constrained local issues questions one of the fundamental postulates of the fiscal federalism lore, namely the widespread credence that decentralization of the power to tax and spend is a key ingredient to foster local government performance and accountability. Moreover, the implications of the position-valence mechanisms that have been highlighted here are likely to transcend the strict fiscal federalism context. It seems plausible that the impact of decentralization on the ideological versus pragmatic nature of local democratic processes be further magnified in possibly more salient and controversial policy domains. Notes: dependent variable = log of the odds transformation of the turnout rate; uses all municipalities for which information on at least two elections is available. Standard errors in parentheses. * * * : p-value < 0.01; * * : p-value < 0.05; * : p-value < 0.10. Table 7 Estimated effects of tax limits on turnout turnout 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% TEL dummy -1.26% -1.22% -1.06% -0.81% -0.46% Notes: effects computed from the estimated coefficient on TL dummy in table 6, column (6.1), as the difference between predicted turnout levels at TL=0 and TL=1. Notes: TL = 1: tax freeze applies in 2006; win margin (0-100) = vote difference standardized by the number of votes of the elected mayor; ♦ : control for population and number of mayor candidates (table A1 in Appendix). Standard errors in parentheses. * * * : p-value < 0.01; * * : p-value < 0.05; * : p-value < 0.10. Table A1 Tax limits and local elections: controls   turnout  candidates win margin  table 8  table 9  table 11 population -0.262 * * * (0.091) 
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